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Two Wrongs Don't Make A Patent Right
DAVID CATECHI*

INTRODUCTION

Recent litigation over genetically modified corn reveals an
increasing imbalance between the property rights of genetic seed
manufacturers and the rights of individual farmers. Common-law
property doctrines and traditional patent law fail to protect farmers
leaving them exposed to both potential genetic contamination of their
crops and costly patent infringement liability. This Note proposes a
simple yet effective solution -Notice. Requiring patent holders to
provide notice to alleged infringing farmers sufficient to enable the
farmer to cease infringement optimally balances the rights of both the
patent holder and the farmer.
Part I of this Note gives a detailed history of the origins of living
organism patents in the United States. The three examples of transgenic
corn cases detailed in Part I.B demonstrate the types of problems that
can arise in this type of litigation. Part II illustrates the failure of existing
common-law property and patent doctrines to correctly balance the
rights of the patent holders and farmers. In addition, alternative solutions
proposed by legal commentators are unlikely to be adopted and do not
achieve the desired balance of rights.
Part III proposes and analyzes a possible solution using the three
cases outlined in Part I.B. This solution derives from a broad
interpretation of the existing notice requirement provided in section
287(a) of the United States Patent Act. This proposal optimally balances
patent holder's rights and alleged infringing farmer's rights; furthers the
purpose of the Patent Act and the notice requirement; and is
economically efficient.
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I. THE HISTORY OF PATENT PROTECTION FOR LIVING ORGANISMS
Living organisms were not the proper subject matter of patents until
the seminal case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty in 198o.' While plants were
eligible for a separate "plant patent" with limited benefits beginning in
1930, the first plant patent was not upheld by the Patent and Trade
Office (PTO) until 1985.' The reason for the delay in plant patents was
the distinction between discovery and invention. In Funk Brothers Seed
Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., the Court explained that the Patent Act does
not and has never granted patents for "the discovery of the phenomena
of nature.... [which are] free to all men and reserved exclusively to
none." 3 Therefore, an organism resulting from a combination of two

separate naturally existing strains of bacteria into one could not receive a
patent In addition, the Court clarified that discoveries of the
"handiwork of nature" are not patentable.5 However, the Court left open
the question of whether it would uphold a patent for a living organism
that did not exist in nature.
A.

THE ORIGIN OF PATENTING LIVING ORGANISMS

In 1972, microbiologist Ananda Chakrabarty applied for a patent on
a genetically modified bacterium he had invented that could break down
crude oil.6 No naturally occurring bacteria breaks down oil in this

fashion. 7 Chakrabarty's patent application contained thirty-six claims
that fell into three categories: (i) claims for the process of making the
bacteria, (2) claims for the material which would support the bacteria;
and (3) claims for the bacteria itself." The patent examiner and the Patent
Office Board of Appeals both denied Chakrabarty's claims for the
bacteria itself on the grounds that living things were not patentable
subject matter.9 Dr. Chakrabarty appealed.
The Chakrabarty Court, in rejecting the PTO's determination,
reasoned that Congress intended patentable subject matter to "include
anything under the sun that is made by man."' Distinguishing the
limitations it had recognized in Funk Brothers, the Court held that
patentable subject matter includes anything invented through "human

i. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (198o).
2. Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (1985).
3. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
4. See id. at 132.
5. Id. at 131.
6. Chakrabarty,447 U.S. at 305.
7. Id. at 31o.
8. Id. at 305-o6.
9. Id. at 306.
io. Id. at 309 (quoting S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. I923, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952)).
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ingenuity" resulting in non-naturally occurring composites of matter." As
a result of the Court's decision in Chakrabarty, the scope of patent
protection expanded to include living organisms created through human
agency that do not exist in nature. As a separate patent act existed for
plants, it was unclear whether this broad scope included plants that were
otherwise eligible for patents under the Plant Patent Act (PPA) and the
Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA).
Five years after Chakrabarty,the PTO extended the broad scope of
the Patent Act to include plants which were previously thought only to
be patentable through the PPA and the PVPA. 2 In 2001 -over fifteen
years and i,8oo plant patents later-the Supreme Court in Pioneer HiBred affirmed the PTO's reasoning and held that the PVPA and the PPA
are coextensive with the Patent Act. 3 The Court explained that the
PVPA and PPA offer fewer protections for inventors but also have a
lower standard for patent qualification. 4 Therefore, a person seeking a
plant patent can choose between the various acts depending on the
proposed patent and the protections they are seeking.
Following the Court's holdings in Chakrabartyand Pioneer Hi-Bred,
few limits constrain the type of living organisms that can be patented. For
example, in r988, Harvard researchers were awarded the first patent for
a mammal-a mouse whose susceptibility to cancer enabled researchers
to detect carcinogenic materials ("Harvard Oncomouse").'"6 Subsequent
patents have been granted for a variety of different animals.
These patented living organisms share one crucial feature -they are
all self-replicating. Without any intervention from an outside source,
these organisms are capable of reproduction. This means that someone
with little to no expertise may easily reproduce patented organisms.
Even worse, it is possible through absolutely no effort or intent for
someone in possession of these organisms to infringe a patent even
without knowing it simply by letting nature take its course. The following
examples provide a framework for the different ways in which selfreplicating organisms can wreak legal havoc.

II.

Id.

Exparte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (i985).
J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 127 (20o).
Id. at 133.
Michele M. Simkin, Squeak Squeak: Patenting of the Harvard Mouse and Where We Go From
Here, INTELLEcTUAL PROPERTY TODAY, Feb. 2004, at i8 ("on April 12, 1988, the USPTO issued U.S.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Patent No. 4,736,866, for 'Transgenic Non-human Mammals,' to Harvard").
16. See, e.g., www.stopanimalpatents.org (listing patents for such animals as beagle dogs,
monkeys, cats, and pigs).
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THREE EXAMPLES OF TRANSGENIC CORN LITIGATION

Throughout history, humans have cultivated agricultural crops and
intentionally selected crops for beneficial characteristics. 7 In the early
I9OOS, based on the works of monk Gregor Mendel, more crude
techniques of mass selection were replaced with a precise process called
hybridization.' 8 This process utilized the dominant and recessive gene
traits of plants to achieve hybrid plants with specifically chosen traits. 9
The most successful hybrid crop was corn." Continuing this trend,
genetic research developed in the I98os and researchers discovered a
process called transformation which enabled integration of foreign DNA
into the plant gene," The resulting plant, described as transgenic or
genetically modified, is quickly becoming ubiquitous. By 2003,
genetically modified crops represented "73% of the cotton, 81% of the
soybeans, and 40% of the corn planted in the United States."22
Corn naturally reproduces through pollination. Each plant produces
pollen which fertilizes other corn plants upon contact with that plant's
reproductive organs. When one breed of corn pollinates another breed, it
is called cross-pollination.23 Once the pollen becomes airborne, it can
travel to neighboring farms and pollinate the corn in the neighbor's
fields. 4 Other than by establishing buffer zones that increase the distance
between corn fields, there are few methods for preventing this crosspollination. 5
Litigation surrounding these transgenic crops is in its relative
infancy. The following three cases represent three scenarios that are
likely to become more common. The case of In re StarLink, depicts how
individual farmer can suffer harm to their crops and economic damage
from transgenic cross-pollination. Monsanto v. McFarling illustrates the
broad reach of patent protection for transgenic plants. Finally, Monsanto
v. Schmeiser, portrays a farmer who was liable for patent infringement
when he took advantage of plants on his farm that were pollinated
17. Rebecca M. Bratspies, Consuming (F)earsof Corn: Public Health and Biopharming, 30 AM.
J.L. & MED. 371, 377 (2004).
8. Keith Aoki, Weeds, Seeds & Deeds: Recent Skirmishes in the Seed Wars, it CARDOZO J. INT'L
&COMP. L. 247, 268 (2003).
19. Bratspies, supra note 17, at 377.
20. Aoki, supra note 18, at 275.
21. Bratspies, supra note 17, at 379.
22. Id. at 380.
23. In re StarLink Corn Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 834 (N.D. III. 2002).
24. Pollen can also be transported by insects, animals, on vehicles, clothing, etc. See, e.g., David
Quist & Ignacio Chapela, Transgenic DNA Introgressed into TraditionalMaize Landraces in Oaxaca,
Mexico, NATURE, NOV. 29, 2001, at 541 (reporting discovery of transgenic DNA in traditional corn
harvested in remote farming communities in the mountains of Mexico).
25. StarLink, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 834 (describing EPA requirements for preventing the crosspollination of genetically modified corn with other types of corn).
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through transgenic cross-fertilization.
i. In re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation
Corn is grown in the United States for both human consumption and
animal feed. Because corn is such an important agricultural product,6
many of the early genetic modification patents were issued for corn.
One example of an early patent was a corn product called StarLink,
patented by Aventis, which was genetically modified to produce a
protein (Cry9C) that is toxic to certain corn eating pests. 7 The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) identified Cry9C as a potential
human allergen and restricted the use of the StarLink corn to animal
feed and other non-human uses."' To obtain even this limited approval,
Aventis had to assure the EPA that the StarLink corn would not make
its way into the human food supply chain. 9 At its peak, StarLink corn
was being cultivated on 350,000 acres of farmland."0 Aventis' assurances
proved hollow, however, when in September 2000, a coalition of
environmental groups discovered patented StarLink genetic material in
several products destined for human consumption.' As a result, these
consumer products were immediately recalled."2
Farmers hurt by the contamination filed lawsuits against Aventis
alleging negligence, strict liability, private nuisance, public nuisance and
conversion.33 In 2002, the District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois ruled against an Aventis motion to dismiss. 4 The court held that
the plaintiffs could make out claims for negligence and nuisance. 5
In order to make valid claims for both, the plaintiffs had to show
that they were damaged by Aventis' actions. 6 Given the facts, it was easy
for the plaintiffs to show damage. Here, the plaintiffs proved that after
their corn was contaminated by the StarLink Corn-through either
cross-pollination or mixing in storage facilities -it rendered the plaintiffs'
corn unfit for human consumption.37 This dramatically reduced the value
of plaintiffs' corn.
Aventis argued that it should not be subject to any nuisance action
26. Aoki, supra note 18, at 272-75.
27. StarLink, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 833-34.
28. Id. at 834.
29. Bratspies, supra note 17, at 386.
30. StarLink, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 835.
31. Bratspies, supra note 17, at 386.
32. Id. at 386-87. When the frenzy of recalls finally subsided, the StarLink corn was "discovered
in more than 300 types of processed foods that had to be pulled from grocery shelves around the
world." Id.
33. StarLink, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 833.

3435.
36.
37.

Id. at 852.
Id.
Id. 843-45.
Id. at 841.
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because it no longer controlled the seeds after they were sold to
farmers." Interpreting relevant state law, the court held that all three
states with jurisdiction over this matter had broad interpretations of
nuisance which extended to manufactured items no longer in control of
the manufacturer.39
The issue of "control" was concurrently being argued in a separate
suit involving agricultural giant Monsanto. Monsanto argued an opposing
position-that the control of their product was not relinquished when
they licensed the product to farmers.4'
2.
Monsanto v. McFarling
Monsanto is one of the world's largest manufacturers of agricultural
products. Monsanto's products include the successful, "Roundup"
herbicide and "Roundup Ready" seed products. Roundup herbicide
works through the use of a growth enzyme inhibitor-glyphosate.4 ' The
glyphosate neutralizes the growth enzyme making it impossible for plants
and weeds to grow.4" The use of this product can be problematic for
farmers because the herbicide cannot discriminate between weeds and
the crop grown by the farmer. To address this problem, Monsanto
patented transgenic plants that are not affected by the herbicide. This
allows the farmer to spray the herbicide directly over the crops and kill
weeds without killing the crops. Monsanto owns the patent to the process
of creating these seeds as well as the patents for the genes within the
herbicide resistant plants.43
Monsanto distributes this technology through licensing agreements
with seed manufacturers as well as farmers themselves. The licensing
agreements strictly control the farmers use of the seed and generally
require that the farmer purchase seeds from Monsanto every season or at
least pay a licensing fee for the use of the technology if the product is
self-propagated by the farmer. When Monsanto learned that one of its
licensees, Homan McFarling (McFarling), was using the patented
technology outside the parameters of the licensing agreement, Monsanto
sued McFarling for breach of the licensing agreement and for patent
infringement."
Beginning in 1998, McFarling began purchasing Monsanto's

38. Id. at 845.
39. Id.
40. See Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("Monsanto argues that
it 'may license a grower to 'use' its patented ROUNDUP READY@ biotechnology to grow a
commercial crop, but decline to license a grower to 'make' patented seed for use or sale as a crop
seed."').
41. Id. at 1338.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44- Id. at 1338-39.
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Roundup Ready soybean products along with the Roundup herbicide.45
Through a licensing agreement with Monsanto, McFarling agreed not to
reuse soybean seeds produced by his crop in a subsequent season.46
When Monsanto learned that McFarling had used seeds containing
Monsanto's patented genes in 1999 and 2000 without purchasing the
seeds from Monsanto, it filed suit against McFarling for patent
infringement.
In response to the Monsanto lawsuit, McFarling alleged several
defenses aimed at restricting Monsanto from claiming patent protection
for the secondary seeds.47 The court did not find any of these defenses
compelling and upheld Monsanto's patent infringement claim on the
secondary seeds." The court held that Monsanto retained rights in the
patent regardless of the generation of seeds:
The licensed and patented product (the first-generation seeds) and the
good made by the licensed product (the second-generation seeds) are
nearly identical copies. Thus, given that we must presume that
Monsanto's '435 patent reads on the first-generation seeds, it also
reads on the second-generation seeds. See '435 patent, col. I65, 1. 12
(claiming "[a] seed of a glyphosate-tolerant plant"). Because the '435
patent would read on all generations of soybeans produced, we hold
that the restrictions in the Technology Agreement prohibiting the
replanting of the second generation of ROUNDUP READY®
soybeans do not extend Monsanto's rights under the patent statute.49
Next, the court rejected McFarling's claims that the PVPA provides
an exception which allows farmers to use second generation seeds
without compensation." Relying on the reasoning Pioneer Hi-Bred, the
court held that the PVPA and Patent Act are separate protections and as
a result, the exceptions of the PVPA do not apply.5'
By granting rights in subsequent generations of self-replicating
crops, the court opened the door to claims that anyone who grows a
secondary crop containing a patented gene is potentially infringing the
claimed patent. Because patent infringement does not require intent,
neighboring farmers whose crops are innocently fertilized with transgenic
pollen may be engaging in patent infringement. While this issue has not
been litigated in any reported decision in the United States, the
Canadian Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of whether a

45. id. at 1339.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1341-44.

48. Id.
49. Id. at 1343.
50. The PVPA provides that farmers may use seeds that are produced from plants protected
under the PVPA. The farmers may only replant the same number of acres as the original purchase. Id.
at 1344.

5.

Id.
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farmer who innocently acquires transgenic crops on his property may
propagate them.
3. Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser
Percy Schmeiser (Schmeiser) had farmed in Bruno, Saskatchewan
for over forty years." Schmeiser was thrown into the transgenic crosspollination patent debate when, in 1998, he was sued by Monsanto
Canada. Monsanto claimed that Schmeiser was growing Roundup Ready
Corn without the requisite licensing agreement and in violation of
Monsanto's patent. Tests revealed that Schmeiser's crops consisted of
over 95% of the patented corn.53
While the details are not entirely clear, it seems Schmeiser obtained
this percentage in the following manner. Schmeiser was in the practice of
saving seeds from his crops and using them to replant his crops in
subsequent years. 4 Schmeiser never purchased any of Monsanto's
Roundup Ready Corn or engaged in any licensing agreement with
Monsanto." However, in 1997, Schmeiser sprayed a three-acre patch of
corn with Roundup and 6o% of the crop survived-suggesting it
contained the glyphosate resistant gene. Schmeiser harvested the seeds
from the surviving plants and planted 1,030 acres the following year. 7
During the 1997 season, a Monsanto investigator tested plants along
a roadway adjacent to Schmeiser's crops and determined that Roundup
Ready Corn was present." He notified Schmeiser that he believed
Schmeiser was growing the corn without a license. 9 Schmeiser continued
to use the seeds sown in his field until Monsanto filed a patent
infringement suit against him.
The Schmeiser case was litigated, appealed, and ultimately decided
by the Canadian Supreme Court in 2004. The Schmeiser court noted that
the Canadian Patent Act gives patent holders the exclusive right to
control the make, construct, or use of their invention. 6' While the court
was not persuaded by Monsanto's argument that Schmeiser "made" or
"constructed" the invention, they were convinced that he did "use" the
patented transgenic gene. 6' To arrive at this conclusion, the court made
www.percyschmeiser.com/conflict.htm.
53. Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2oo41 S.C.R. 902,912.
54. Id. at 927.
55. Id. at 912.
56. It is unclear how this three-acre patch contained such a high percentage of Roundup Ready
corn. Id. It is suggested by the court that Schmeiser used this same method on a part of crop that
abutted neighboring farms and then used those seeds in the three-acre patch. Id. What was clear was
that five of Schmeiser's neighboring farmers were using the patented product. Id. at 911.
57. Id. at 928, 930.
58. Id. at 928.
59, Id.
6o. Id. at 917.
61, Id. at 937.
52.
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several inquiries. The preliminary determination concerned whether
there was "utilization with a view to production or advantage. '' 6' Next,
the court asked whether "the defendant's activity deprive[d] the inventor
in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, of full enjoyment of the
monopoly conferred by law?"6 Finally, the court determined whether
"appellants employed or possessed the patented invention in the context
of their commercial or business interests." 64 In this case, the court
answered all three questions in the affirmative. Monsanto showed that
they had a valid patent on Roundup Ready Corn; that Schmeiser planted
1,030 acres of Roundup Ready corn; and that Schmeiser did not pay the
$15 per acre licensing fee; and thus deprived Monsanto of its monopoly.
While this inquiry is usually enough to show infringement, the court
struggled with Schmeiser's defense that while he possessed the patented
item, he did not "use" it. While the court recognized that intent is not
required in traditional patent law, the court still looks to intent when a
defendant argues possession without use. 6' The court found that
Schmeiser did not take advantage of the gene by spraying Roundup, but
he did benefit from the "insurance" or "stand-by utility" of having that
gene present.66 Schmeiser failed to rebut this presumption of use by
gene
showing that he did not intend to take advantage of the patented
67
and was ultimately held to have infringed on Monsanto's patent.
Schmeiser also attempted to argue that he had an implied license or
that Monsanto had waived its rights because he an innocent bystander.6
The court quickly rejected this contention based on its finding that
Schmeiser lost his "innocence" the moment he selected for the specific69
gene and replanted his entire crop with the resulting seeds.
Furthermore, traditional 7 common-law property notions, such as the
"stray animals" doctrine, did not apply because this is a case of patent
infringement, not ownership.
Ultimately, the Canadian court found Schmeiser liable for patent
infringement. The case turned on his intentional conduct of selecting for
the patented crop, propagating it, and planting his fields with the
patented crop. In spite of this finding, in a strange twist, vindication of
62. Id. at 930.
63. Id. at 99.
64. Id. at 930.
65. Id. at 924.
66. Id. at 933-34.
67. Id. at 933, 937.
68. Id. at 936.
69. Id.
70. The "stray animals" doctrine suggests that a farmer whose cow is impregnated by a
neighboring farmer's cow who trespasses on his property may keep the offspring. For a more detailed
discussion of the "stray animals" doctrine see infra Part II.C.2; Drew L. Kershen, Of Straying Crops
and PatentRights, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 575 (2004).
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Monsanto's rights did not lead to financial recompense. In Canada, the
patentee is "only entitled to that portion of the infringer's profit which is
causally attributable to the invention. "7' Monsanto could not show that
Schmeiser profited because he never used Roundup and the finished
crop was not worth any more because of the patented gene. 72 Therefore,
the court did not grant Monsanto any damages.73
II.

EXISTING AND PROPOSED DOCTRINES FAIL TO
BALANCE RIGHTS APPROPRIATELY

There are relatively few cases dealing with the inadvertent spread of
transgenic pollen among neighboring farms. The use of transgenic crops,
however, is markedly increasing every year.74 Spread of transgenic genes
is reaching epic proportions.75 In addition to food crops, pharmaceutical
companies are patenting technology that allows the companies to grow
pharmaceuticals inside crops such as corn.76 As the value of an individual
crop increases, this doctrine will become much more important and will
need to advance to deal with competing interests. The value of one acre
of Roundup Ready corn will not compare to one acre of the latest
pharmaceutical discovery. On the forefront of this expansion, U.S. courts
should adopt rules which ensure a proper balance between the rights of
individual farmers, rights of patent holders, and the desire to promote
the progress of science. Both the existing and proposed doctrines fail to
properly balance these rights, and as a result frustrate the development
of new patents.
The doctrine ultimately adopted needs to balance these interests in
three separate situations represented loosely by the cases in Part I. The
first case represents a direct violator such as Homan McFarling. In this
scenario, the farmer has contracted with a patent holder through a
licensing agreement to grow the patented crop. The farmer then tries to
grow that crop outside of the existing contract.77 Perry Schmeiser is a
71.
72.
73.
74.

Schmeiser, [20041 S.C.R. at 938.
Id. at 938-39 .
Id. at 939.
See supra text accompanying note

22.

75. MARGARET MELLON & JANE RISSLER, GONE TO SEED: TRANSGENIC CONTAMINANTS IN THE
TRADITIONAL SEED SUPPLY, (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2004), available at www.ucsusa.org/

documents/seedreport fullreport.pdf. This recent report details the "pervasive contamination" of the
traditional seed supply by transgenic material. Id. at 45. This conclusion is based on tests conducted by
two respected commercial laboratories using duplicate samples of seeds of six traditional varieties
each of corn, soybean, and canola. One laboratory detected transgenically derived DNA in 50% of the
corn, 50% of the soybean, and ioo% of the traditional canola varieties tested. The other laboratory
detected transgenically derived DNA in 83% of the traditional varieties of each of the three crops.
The most conservative expression of the combined results is that transgenically derived DNA was
detected in 50% of the corn, 50% of the soybean, and 83% of the canola varieties tested. Id. at 1-2.
76. Bratspies, supra note 17, at 371.
77. These three scenarios also apply generally to any patented self-replicating organisms.
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779

perfect example of the second scenario-the indirect violator. Here, the
farmer does not have a contract with the patent holder. In addition, the
farmer acquires the patented transgenic crop innocently through some
version of cross-pollination. As in Schmeiser, the farmer finds a way to
select for the patented trait specifically and propagates his crops to take
advantage of that trait. The third situation involves an "innocent"
farmer. The farmer acquires the patented crop through cross-pollination
innocently and either does not select for the patented trait or selects for
the trait but does not know that it is a patented trait they are selecting. 78
A.

COMMON LAW PROPERTY DOCTRINEs FAIL TO PROTECT THE INDIVIDUAL
FARMER

Farmers whose crops are contaminated with transgenic varieties
have limited protection under existing common-law property doctrines
such as: negligence, nuisance, and trespass. Due to the nature of the
contamination, these farmers will find it difficult to make out a sufficient
case to prevail in court against neighboring farmers and the patent
holders of transgenic crops. StarLink, discussed above, exemplifies how a
farmer can attempt to seek common-law property protections to redress
damage caused by transgenic pollen. It also shows, however, the
difficulty of bringing such claims. While the farmers in StarLink survived
summary judgment, there are many other factual scenarios which leave
farmers without protection for damages suffered and without protection
from claims by patent holders. Transgenic crops are often identical to
natural crops and do not clearly indicate their origin. As a result, it may
be impossible for farmers to know or prove that there has been
contamination in the first place, the extent of damage suffered, and the
origin of the transgenic pollen. Because of the numerous hurdles
associated with the nature of transgenic crops, the following common law
property doctrines provide little respite for these farmers.
I.

Negligence

While the StarLink example above appears to indicate that
negligence actions would serve to protect farmers interests, many
farmers outside the narrow facts of StarLink will find it difficult to make
the necessary showing of duty, proximate cause/cause-in-fact, and
damages. First, the plaintiff farmer must show that the patent holder
owed him or her a duty of some kind.79 In StarLink, the court
characterized the duty as preventing contamination of the complaining

78. For years, farmers have been in the practice of selecting for the most profitable traits among
their stock. It is imaginable that a farmer might select for a trait that is patented without knowledge of
the patent. For example, if there is a patent on a gene that gives the corn a more protective husk, the
farmer may select plants that have that trait without knowing the trait is not naturally occurring.
79. In re StarLink Corn Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828,843 (2002).
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farmer's crops. 8° The government's imposition of restictions to contain
the Cry9C crops and keep the corn out of the food supply created a legal
duty for Aventis. 8' But government has not imposed such restrictions on
most genetically modified corn and, as a result, most plaintiff farmers will
have a difficult time proving that there is a duty to prevent
contamination.
The next hurdle the farmer needs to overtake is causation."2 Plaintiff
farmers must be able to identify the source of the contamination and
prove that the source caused the harm. The source, however, may be
impossible to identify when several potential sources exist. For example,
in Schmeiser, five adjacent farmers had planted Roundup Ready corn."
To meet this element, Schmeiser would need to identify the specific crop
owner who contaminated his crops."4 Assuming that the identity of the
crop owner could be pinpointed, the plaintiff farmer faces an additional
hurdle-identifying the manufacturer of the patented crop. Doing so is
virtually impossible wihtout prohibitively costly genetic testing. If the
manufacturer can be ascertained, a causal link may be established
through the licensing agreements commonly established between farmers
and transgenic seed manufacturers. Even if the farmer is able to get this
far, he must still prove damages.
Harm and the resulting damage may be the most difficult element
for plaintiff farmers to prove. Comparing and contrasting the facts of
Schmeiser and StarLink help identify the difficulty of establishing
damages. The StarLink plaintiff was able to show that there was a
"harm" because the crops that had been cross-pollinated with the
transgenic gene "render[ed] what would otherwise be a valuable food
crop unfit for human consumption."' ' In contrast, the plaintiff farmer in
Schmeiser did not suffer any type of traditional harm. In fact, the farmer
benefited from the cross-pollination."" Moreover, the value of his crop on
the open market was unchanged as a result of the contamination. With
the proliferation and acceptance of genetically modified foods, a plaintiff

8o. Id.
8I. Id. at 834.

82. See id. at 843 (analyzing the issue of "causation" in a negligence allegation).
83. Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. 902, 911.
84. If the case occurred in California, the plaintiff farmer might be able to avail himself of the
doctrine of Summers v. Tice which shifts the burden to defendants to prove that they were not the

source of the negligent act where there is more than one who could have caused the harm. 199 P.21 1,
8 (Cal. 1948).
85. StarLink, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 841.
86. The Canadian Supreme Court held that while Schmeiser did not use Roundup on the
infringing crop, he did benefit from the "stand-by utility" of knowing that had he needed to he could
have sprayed the crop without harming the corn. Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. at 932-33. Additionally,
because of the utility of transgenic crops, mere possession of the crop could benefit an infringing
farmer.
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farmer would be hard pressed to base the harm analysis on a theory that
the transgenic plants are unsafe or dangerous."' The Schmeiser court was
quick to point out, though, that Schmeiser was not an organic farmer.88
Had that been the case, he could have argued that his crops were no
longer organic and thus he suffered harm.89
Ultimately, a negligence cause of action would be difficult to prove
due to the barriers mentioned above. While a farmer may prevail in
certain narrow situations, this doctrine does not protect the average
farmer who fears cross-pollination with transgenic crops. Even worse,
this doctrine does not protect a farmer from potentially destructive
patent infringement actions that could be brought against him as a result
of the innocent acquisition of the patented crops.
2. Nuisance
As with other common law property doctrines, there are many
barriers to establishing a nuisance claim. Under nuisance doctrine
generally, a plaintiff farmer must show "an invasion of [an] interest in the
private use and enjoyment of [his] land."' This invasion must be
"intentional and unreasonable" 91 and must also cause "significant
harm."92 This standard is difficult for many plaintiff farmers to meet.
Initially, the farmer needs to argue that the cross-pollination is
"unreasonable." The StarLink farmer was able to make out a prima facie
case in this regard because of the regulatory restrictions imposed on
Aventis to control the spread of pollen.93 -Unfortunately, most farmers
would not be able to make such a connection because of the absence of
such regulatory restrictions for other transgenic crops. Furthermore, the
same problem found with a negligence claim regarding "harm" applies in
this context. Here, a "significant harm" must be established.94 Unless the
farmer shows the value of his crop depreciated or that his farm was unfit
for its intended purpose (like in the case of an organic farmer), it would
be virtually impossible to meet this requirement.
87. But see, e.g., Carie-Megan Flood, Pollen Drift and PotentialCauses of Action, 28 J. CORP. L.

473, 489-90 (2003) (suggesting that pollen-drift of some transgenic crops might qualify as "abnormally
dangerous" for tort purposes).
88. For example, a non-organic farmer whose crops are cross-pollinated with a transgenic gene
that produces a higher yield crop does not suffer a detrimental contamination. Conversely, it may be
argued that a farmer who benefits from cross-fertilization would not need the protection of property
law because they are not damaged. An interesting factual scenario would exist if an independent
farmer was sued by a patent holder and the innocent farmer sued the adjacent farmer for exposing him
to that liability through pollen contamination.
89. Hillary Preston, Note, Drift of Patented Genetically Engineered Crops: Rethinking Liability
Theories, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1153, 1 61 (2003); Flood, supra note 87, at 485.
o
9 . RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (2004).
91. Id.

Id. at § 821F.
93. In re StarLink Corn Prods. Liab. Litig.,
94- Id.

92.

212

F. Supp.

2d 828,

843 (2002).
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3. Trespass
A cause of action for trespass, however, may provide some
protection for plaintiff farmers.95 Liability for trespass on land exists
when a person "intentionally... enters land in the possession of the
other, or causes a thing to do so [or] fails to remove from the land a thing
which he is under a duty to remove." 96 Commentators in this area often
cite Martin v. Reynolds Metal Co. to suggest that common law trespass
principles could be extended to a cause of action for trespass resulting
from pollen drift.' In Reynolds, the court held that "invisible" fluoride
particulates which settled on the plaintiff's land could constitute a
trespass.98 Moreover, in determining trespass, plaintiff farmers do not
need to show that the actions of the invading person or thing caused any
harm." However, as is the case in the negligence analysis, plaintiff
farmers still have the difficulty of identifying the source of the
contamination. Nevertheless, of all the common-law property doctrines,
trespass appears to be the easiest for plaintiff farmers to employ with
success.
In conclusion, each of these three property doctrines fail to
adequately protect the individual farmer. Each has at least one major
barrier that would be difficult to surpass in the context of transgenic
pollen contamination. Additionally, as explained in the following section,
these doctrines are not defenses to patent infringment liabilty. And
unfortunately, traditional patent infringment defenses also fall short of
addressing the problem.
B.

TRADITIONAL PATENT DOCTRINES FAIL TO PROTECT THE INDIVIDUAL
FARMER

While common law property doctrines provide limited protection to
farmers from unwanted cross-pollination of transgenic crops in limited
circumstances, these doctrines are not defenses to patent infringement.
As the Canadian Supreme Court pointed out in Schmeiser, these
doctrines relate to ownership or infringement of rights of ownership."°
Patent law, however, is not about ownership of a product but rather

95. StarLink, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 844 (noting in dicta that the facts of the case could "constitute a
trespass to chattels, but does not rise to the level of conversion"); Flood, supra note 89 at 482 ("Pollen
drift from a GM farm to a non-GM farm may constitute trespass in several jurisdictions."); Preston,
supra note 89 at 1166 (noting that the elements of trespass are "easily applicable to genetic drift").
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (2OO4).
97. 342 P.2d 790 (Or. 1959); Flood, supra note 87 at 483-84; Preston, supra note 89 at i166.
98. Reynolds, 342 P.2d at 793-94.
99. Id. at 796; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 163 (2004) ("One who intentionally enters land

in the possession of another is subject to liability to the possessor for a trespass, although his presence
on the land causes no harm to the land, its possessor, or to any thing or person in whose security the
possessor has a legally protected interest.").
ioo. Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. 902,937.
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about an exclusive monopoly right to make, sell, or use a patented
product.'"' Percy Schmeiser may have suffered a tort, or may "own" the
corn on his property, but this is distinct from the fact that he utilized the
patented function of the Roundup Ready corn. If farmers wish to protect
themselves from infringement liability they must turn to patent law.
Three patent doctrines-the first sale doctrine, the implied license
doctrine and the misuse doctrine-appear to address the problem but
when applied to this factual scenario, fail to protect innocent infringers.
I. FirstSale Doctrine/Doctrineof Exhaustion
The first sale doctrine (otherwise known as the doctrine of
exhaustion) can be used as a defense to patent infringement. The
doctrine stands for the proposition that a patent holder exhausts all
rights in a specific patented product when he sells it to another party.' 2
At first glance, this defense is enticing because it appears as if a
patent holder relinquishes all interests in a patent once the product is
released into the wind. However, further investigation into the case law
reveals that this defense has been severely limited in recent years."
Specifically, as applied in McFarling,the Federal Circuit appears to have
completely eviscerated all possibility for its use when it held:
The restrictions in the Technology Agreement are within the scope of
the patent grant, for the patents cover the seeds as well as the plants.
The "first sale" doctrine of exhaustion of the patent right is not
implicated, as the new seeds grown from the original batch had never
been sold. The price paid by the purchaser "reflects only the value of
the 'use' rights conferred by the patentee." The original sale of the
seeds did not confer a license to construct new seeds, and since the new
seeds were not sold by the patentee they entailed no principle of patent
exhaustion."

As a result, even if a neighboring farmer innocently acquires patented
transgenic crops, the patent holder can overcome the defense by simply
showing that they have retained rights in the patent. As is the case in
McFarling, patent holders of transgenic crops use similar licensing
agreements to retain rights in their patent. Therefore, unless there is a
sea-change in this doctrine it is not likely to protect the innocent farmer.
2.
Implied License/Waiver
The defense of implied license is closely related to the first sale
doctrine."'° An implied license, however, does not require the "sale" of
loI. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
102. 5-16 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS (2004), § 16.03 [21[a].
IO3. See, e.g., Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
104. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (subsequent appeal at
Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3 d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004)) (quoting B. Braun Med. Inc. v. Abbott
Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). The subsequent appeal is discussed supra notes 41-51.
1O5 . 5-16 CHISUM, supra note 1O2 § I6.O3[2][b].
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the allegedly infringing item. °6 For example, in an implied license case,
the patent holder sells the third party a machine to make the patented
product but does not grant the third party an express license to make the
patented product.'" If the machine has any other non-infringing uses,
courts will often deny an implied license.' Although an implied license is
rarely found," courts will do so when they feel that through the course of
the parties' conduct the use of the patent was implied by the sale of the
first device. "0° An implied license would be difficult to prove here because
the patent holder has no relationship -business, contractual or
otherwise-with the alleged infringer. Unless the implied license
doctrine is expanded, it would be difficult to invoke this doctrine."'
3. Misuse/Unclean Hands
The patent misuse defense has its origins in the equitable doctrine of
"unclean hands ..... If a patent owner attempts to expand the monopoly
of the patent "beyond its lawful scope," then the court may withhold
remedy until the practice constituting misuse ends, even if the defendant
is not harmed by the misuse." 3 However, no court has yet to find any
misuse inherent in the seed licensing scheme described here.
In Monsanto v. McFarling, the defendant argued that enforcing a
patent on subsequent generations of seeds was impermissible tying and
increased the scope of Monsanto's patent." 4 The court held that
Monsanto did not impermissibly extend the scope of its patent because
the successive generations of seeds were "nearly identical copies" and
found that the original patent read on all subsequent generations."5
Therefore, the court did not extend the scope of the patent to require6
additional licensing fees from the licensee for second-generation seeds. n
io6. Id.
io7. Id. at Supp. to § 16.o3[21[b][iii] (describing two federal circuit court decisions relating to
implied license and the requirements of the doctrine).
io8. Id.
io9. Wang Lab. v. Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., lO3 F.3d 1571, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[Jludicially

implied licenses are rare under any doctrine.").
iIo. Id. at i58o.
iii. An argument can be made that the "course of conduct" in farming is allowing pollen to be
widely distributed. Because the pollen is freely distributed, an implied right to use the resulting plants
attaches. The implied license doctrine appears to be narrowly applied and it does not appear likely
that a court would broaden the doctrine to include this argument. There is also a weak argument that
if a patent holder allowed cross-pollination to continue for many years, knowing of its existence, yet
failed to enforce the patent, then the patentholder should be equitably estopped from trying to enforce
the patent against the infringing farmer. This scenario, however, is not a factual predicate for this
paper.
112. United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457,465 (957).
113. 6-19 CHISUM, supra note 102, § 19.04; See Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3 d 1336, 1341
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
I14. McFarling,363 F. 3 d at 1341.
1i 5 . Id. at 1343.

1i6. Id.
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The situation in McFarling is distinguishable from that of an
innocent farmer with no contractual relation to the manufacturer. When
Monsanto demands licensing fees from neighboring farmers, who by no
choice of their own had the patent thrust upon them, Monsanto is
essentially extending the scope of their patent.' This argument is
susceptible to criticism, however, because Monsanto is merely trying to
enforce the patent granted by the PTO and is not seeking to extend their
patent to other unpatented products. The bottom line, however, is that as
the law stands today no farmer has successfully prevailed on a misuse
theory and courts do not appear open to expanding
the doctrine to
8
situations even remotely similar to the facts here.'
Due to the weakness of both the common law property and existing
patent doctrines, proposals for new doctrines have emerged in academic
journals. Some commentators have suggested such proposals as adding
an intent element to this specific type of infringement while others have
gone farther afield to propose a new doctrine based on the common law
property doctrine of stray animals.
C.

PROPOSED PATENT DOCTRINES FAIL TO PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF THE
PATENT HOLDER

As the controversy over the spread of transgenic pollen continues,
commentators have suggested varying solutions. In particular, there have
been suggestions to add intent-to-acquire as an element of patent
infringement. Other suggestions, like the doctrine of stray animals,
involve integrating traditional common-law property theories into patent
law. As the following sections explain, these doctrines are not likely to
achieve the desired results and are similarly not likely to be adopted by
courts.
i. "Intent" as an Element of Infringement
Some commentators have suggested adding "intent" as an element
in the infringement analysis." 9 Today, knowledge and intent are not
required elements of patent infringement.'20 As one court put it, "[i]t is,
of course, elementary, that an infringement may be entirely inadvertent
and unintentional and without knowledge of the patent .... ' This basically
makes patent infringment a strict liability offense.
A recent Note suggested adding "intent to acquire" as an element of
infringement when dealing with self-propagating organisms.'22 The
117. For a fuller discussion of such a scenario see infra note 179 and accompanying text.
i is. See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham v. Apotex, 365 F.3d 13o6, 316 (2004) (declining to apply Judge
Posner's equitable defense theory).
i 19. See, e.g., Preston, supra note 89, at 1167.
120. 5-16 CHIsUM,supra note 102, § 16.o2[2].
121. Blair v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 291 F. Supp. 664,670 (D.C. 1968).
122. Preston, supra note 89, at 1167, 1170.
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author justified this approach based on several factors: the type of
infringement; the type of patented item; the inappropriateness of an
"affirmative duty ...on the farmer to keep his property clear of GMO
material"; and equitable concerns.'23 This would provide a shield for
farmers who acquired pollen through cross-pollination even if they later
used the patented crop to their advantage. The problem with this
approach is it eviscerates the rights of those who have patents in plants
that generate transgeni- pollen. A neighboring farmer would be able to
intentionally infringe on the patent if he acquired the pollen innocently
and without intent, regardless of whether he later intentionally
propagated his entire crop with the patented seed.
The Schmeiser court also addressed the issue of intent but it did not
do so in the context of its direct infringment analysis. Instead, the court
allowed intent to come in as a defense to the allegation that the
infringing farmer "used" the patented item. If the farmer could show that
he did not intend to "use" the patented plant, then he might be able to
escape infringement liability.'24 Thus "intent" only comes into play in
situations where there is "possession without use. '
This approach may be useful under the limited facts of Schmeiser,
but would be difficult to apply in other contexts." 6 Schmeiser was able to
identify that the patented corn was on his property by applying Roundup
on a select patch of crop which killed everything but the patented corn.
For many other patented crops it is almost impossible to differentiate the27
tests.'
patented from the non-patented crops without expensive genetic
Furthermore, as Justice Arbour points out in the Schmeiser dissent, an
innocent infringer would have a difficult time rebutting "use" once he
knows that the patented crop was in his possession.2S Because "intent to
use" is easily found through mere possession, it would provide little
protection for the neighboring farmer.
If the "intent to acquire" proposal is adopted, patent holder rights
are lost. In contrast, if the "intent to use" proposal is adopted, innocent
farmers receive no more protection than exists under current patent
doctrine. Accordingly, neither provides the adequate balance necessary
to protect both the patent holder and the innocent farmer.

123. Id. at 1167.

Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. 902,926.
Id. at 925.
o
126. See, e.g., Kershen, supra note 7 , at 585-87 (criticizing "intent-to-acquire" proposals as
unlikely, overbroad, and not appropriate for implementation for specific technologies).
127. For example, in StarLink, farmers were unable to distinguish the StarLink corn from their
2002).
regular crops. 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 841 (N.D. I11.
128. Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. at 955 (Arbour, J. dissenting) (explaining that because the usual
farming practice is to save seeds for replanting, knowledge of the presence of the corn combined with
sewing seeds would likely result in infringement).
124.
125.
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"Stray Animals" Doctrine
In a recent article on the subject, Professor Drew Kershen suggests
that courts should apply the common-law doctrine of stray animals to the
spread of transgenic pollen.'29 Kershen's article proposes that airborne
transgenic pollen be likened to a stray animal that has entered a
neighboring farm's property. For example, when a bull comes on a
neighboring property and impregnates a cow, the resulting offspring is
generally held to be the property of the owner of the cow.'30 In addition,
when an animal enters neighboring property and causes damage, the
owner of the property has the right to trap and hold the animal until the
damage to the property has been paid for by the animals owner.'3'
Kershen aptly applies these doctrines to pollen drift but does not address
under what authority a court may supersede patent protections.
Ultimately, as suggested above, common-law property doctrines may be
appropriate as a coextensive remedy or determining ownership but they
are not a defense to patent infringement. Moreover, there is nothing to
suggest that courts are likely to adopt this doctrine.
2.

III.

THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT OF 35 U.S.C. § 287 BALANCES
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND PROMOTES SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS

The problem with the current state of the law, as explained in Part
II, is an imbalance of property rights between patent holders of selfreplicating organisms and the farmers whose crops bear the significant
risk of contamination. This imbalance results from the combination of
the strict-liability character of patent infringement with the nature of
self-replicating organisms and problems with identification. In some
circumstances, a farmer may be liable for infringement but unable to end
the infringement without destroying all his crops. Moreover, as the value
of transgenic crops increases, so does the likelihood of patent
enforcement actions and the potential for liability. Common-law
property notions fail to fully protect farmers' rights or shield them from
costly patent infringement lawsuits. On the other hand, many proposed
solutions for this developing problem do not respect patent holders rights
and seek to severely limit patentholders' ability to protect their interests.
This in turn dampens manufacturers' incentive to develop new patents.
Ironically, the best solution is not in judicially-created doctrines,
common law property doctrines, or traditinional patent defenses, but
rather exists plainly in the text of the the notice requirement of the
Patent Act ("Notice Requirement"). 32
129. Kershen, supra note 70 at 592. This argument was also made and summarily dismissed by the
Canadian Supreme Court in Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. at 936-37.

13o. Kershen, supra note 70, at 597.
131. Id. at 593-94.
132. 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2004).
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A PROPOSED INTERPRETATION
The Notice Requirement, a longstanding element of patent law,
THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT:

should be interpreted broadly, consistent with its purpose, to provide
enough information in the notice to allow the alleged infringer to cease
infringing. This interpretation will optimally balance the rights of patent
holders and farmers who may be infringing on the rights of patent
holders as a result of cross-pollination. It provides protections for
farmers where common law property and other patent doctrines fail. It
also protects the monopoly granted holders of patents for self-replicating
organisms. And finally, using this section of the Patent Act in this context
furthers the purpose of patent law.
i.

The Patent Statute

In early statutes, patent holders were not required to provide any
notice of their ownership of patents to consumers.'33 With the passage of
the Patent Act of i86i, the legislature created the origin of today's notice
statute by providing limitations on recovery of damages for failure to
mark patented items.'34 The current notice statute provides in pertinent
part:
(a) Patentees, and persons making, offering for sale, or selling within
the United States any patented article for or under them, or importing
any patented article into the United States, may give notice to the
public that the same is patented, either by fixing thereon the word
"patent" or the abbreviation "pat.", together with the number of the
patent, or when, from the character of the article, this can not be done,
by fixing to it, or to the package wherein one or more of them is
contained, a label containing a like notice. In the event of failure so to
mark, no damages shall be recovered by the patentee in any action for
infringement, except on proof that the infringer was notified of the
infringement and continued to infringe thereafter, in which event
damages may be recovered only for infringement occurring after such
notice. Filing of an action for infringement shall constitute such

notice."'
There are several interpretations of the purpose of this statute. At
the most basic level, the purpose of the statute is to encourage patent
holders to notify the public that the item is patented. 6 Specifically, the
"statutory duty is to prevent patent owners from deceiving the public by
distributing unmarked (and hence apparently copyable) articles which
are in fact covered by a patent."'37 Instead of placing the burden on the
alleged infringer to investigate whether any products in use might be
133. 7-20 CHISUM, supra note IO2, § 20.03 [7][c][i].
134. Id. (providing a complete history of the development of the notice statute).
135. 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2ooo). This provision is limited by the rest of the statute and does not
apply to process patents.
136. Amsted Indus., Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 185 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
137. 7-20 CHISUM, supra note 102, § 20.03 [7][c].
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patented,38 the statute imposes a duty to notify upon patent holders and
licensees.'39 This Note suggests the required notice should therefore
contain enough detail to inform the alleged infringer of the infringing
conduct and provide enough information to allow abatement of the
infringement. 4 0
The notice requirement provides the, patent holder and licensees
with two distinct methods of compliance. First, the patent holder may
affix the item or the packaging with the word "patent" and the patent
number. 4 ' In the event that the patent holder is unable to comply with
this requirement, the second method allows the patent holder to give
actual notice to the infringer.'42 If the patent holder relies on the second
method, damages may only be assessed for the period after the notice is
given. 1" Irrespective of proper marking and notice, patent holders still
retain the right to seek an injunction.'
Here, neighboring farmers acquire patented transgenic genes
through airborne pollen. As a result, patent holders would be unable to
comply with the physical marking requirement and must therefore rely
on the specific-notice-to-infringer portion of the statute. Absent proper
marking, the patent holder has an affirmative duty to provide actual
notice of the infringement to the alleged infringer in order to recover
damages.'45 Specifically, this notice must be of "the infringement" and
requires an "affirmative communication of a specific charge of
infringement by a specific accused product or device.' ', 6 The duty that
arises in the "actual notice" context is on the patent holder and therefore
it does not matter if the alleged infringer has actual knowledge of the
patent or even knew that he was infringing on the patent. ' In Amsted,
the court held that a letter which generally informed the alleged infringer
of the existence of the patent did not meet the requirements of section
287.' 4 A second letter, however, which alleged infringement

and

specified the infringing device, was enough to satisfy the statute.'4 9 There
138. 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2000); 7-20 CHISUM, supra note 102, § 20.03 [7 ][c][ii].
139. Amsted, 24 F.3d at 185 (applying the provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 287 to implied licensees); 7-20
CHISUM, supra note 102 § 20.03 [7][c][ii] ("Section 287 clearly extends the duty to mark to licensees.").
140. See Lans v. Digital Equip. Corp., 252 F.3d 1320, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2ooi) (holding that its

proposed rule "fulfills the purposes of § 287(a) by facilitating the alleged infringer's efforts to avoid
continued infringement, and avoids troublesome determinations about the sufficiency of relationships
between the notifier and the patentee").
141. § 287(a); 7-20 CHisuM, supra note 102, § 20.03
142. § 287(a); 7-20 CHISUM, supra note 102, § 20.03
143. § 287(a); 7-20 CHISVM, supra note 102, § 20.03
144. 7-20 CHISUM, supra note 102, § 20.03 [7][c][vi].
145. Amsted Indus., Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings
146. Id. at 187.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.

[7][c].
[7 ][c][iv].
[71[c][iv].
Co., 24 F.3 d 178, 186-87 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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are no steadfast requirements for the content of the notice but it must be
enough to give notification of the patent alleged to be infringed, the
alleged infringing conduct, and in some5 circumstances, reasonable
suggestions for compliance with the patent.10
2.
The Proposal:Broad Application of the Notice Requirement
Consistent with the PatentAct's Purpose
Adherence to the language and purpose of the notice requirement
will achieve a balance between the rights of all interested parties. Courts
have varied in the application of the notice requirement-sometimes
allowing minimal notice from the patent holder to the alleged infringer.'5 '
This Note proposes, however, that the notice requirement be interpreted
broadly to require the patent holder to provide enough information in
the notice to allow the alleged infringer to cease infringing. The analysis
for the three scenarios described above would be as follows:
a. The StarLink Scenario
If the StarLink farmers had been sued for patent infringement,
Aventis would easily have a prima facie case. This is true even though
they possessed second-generation plants. The farmers grew StarLink
corn and the benefited from the utility of the Cry9C protein which
provided pest control. Absent a judicially-created intent requirement as
in Schmeiser, the StarLink farmer would be liable.
The notice requirement provides that Aventis may only receive
damages accruing after notification of the farmer. In this case, Aventis
would be required to comply with the second part of the statute because
the farmer did not purchase the product with ample notification, but
rather acquired the product through cross-pollination. Assume, for
example, Aventis notified the farmer that it believed the farmer
possessed corn crops containing the patented protein; that Aventis
owned that patent; and that Aventis intended to initiate litigation if the
farmer refused to pay royalties or cease growing the patented corn. In
this instance, it is impossible to visually differentiate between the
transgenic corn and the natural corn. As a result, the only way the farmer
could comply would be to either pay royalties or destroy the entire crop.
The proposed rule would require that the patent holder provide
notice which would allow the farmer to cease infringement. Aventis
would need to provide a method for identification to the farmer or would
have to forgo damages. To this end, Aventis would need to utilize some
type of visual marker on the plant which allowed for differentiation
between the transgenic and natural corn. Even if the farmer continually
150. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc. v. Ottawa Plant Food, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 2d o18, 1051-52 (N.D.
Iowa 2003). But see, 7-20 CHISUM, supra note 102, § 20.03[7][c][iv] ("the notice need not contain a
detailed statement or an explication of the patent owner's theory concerning infringement").
151. 7-20 CHISUM, supra note 102.
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propagated the patented product without specifically selecting for the
patented gene, taking full advantage of its benefits, no damages would
accrue.
b. The McFarling Scenario
This is the simplest of all the scenarios. Here, the notice requirement
is met when the farmer purchases seeds. Each bag customarily has the
patent number on the bag which puts the farmer on notice of the patent
holder's rights. When the farmer plants this seed, he is on notice that
subsequent plants will also have the same patented properties.
Furthermore, most licensing agreements require licensing fees each time
the patent is used and, as a result, the farmer is on continued notice of
the patent's presence.
c.

The Schmeiser Scenario'52

In this instance, Schmeiser was notified by Monsanto's investigator
in 1997 that Schmeiser was infringing on Monsanto's patented Roundup
Ready corn. Schmeiser specifically selected for the transgenic Roundup
Ready corn and subsequently planted i,03o acres of seed he knew
contained Monsanto's patented gene.'53
Looking at the totality of the circumstances, Schmeiser could have
ceased infringement after the Monsanto notification because he had
already employed a method to separate his corn from the Roundup
Ready corn. Therefore, in this case, the notice requirement would be
satisfied and Monsanto could receive damages for the 1998 crop
containing the Roundup Ready corn.
Monsanto would not be able to claim damages for any crop prior to
1998. The notice requirement was not satisfied until Schmeiser was
actually notified and able to cease infringement. The 1998 crop was the
first crop Schmeiser planted after he was notified and after he knew
which seeds contained the patented gene. Therefore, Schmeiser would
not be liable for any damages for growing the patented crop prior to the
notice.
B.

THIS INTERPRETATION PROVIDES AN OPTIMAL SOLUTION

This interpretation of the Notice Requirement optimally balances
the rights of the individual farmer and the patent holder. It furthers the
purpose of the Patent Act and the notice requirement. Finally, it
provides an economically effective result.

152. There does not appear to be any comparable notice requirement under Canadian Patent Law.
153. This seed was produced after spraying a swatch of Schmeiser's crop with Roundup, thus
specifically selecting for the patented product. Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, [20041 S.C.R. 902,
928-29.
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I. The Rights of the IndividualFarmer
Application of this rule to the problem at issue here will protect
farmers from unfair liability which arises when they innocently acquire
patented transgenic crops through cross-pollination. Quite simply, this
rule would relieve truly innocent farmers when they are found to be
growing transgenic crops without a license. Additionally, it will
encourage patent holders to utilize existing methods to either stem the
tide of drifting pollen or find a way to incorporate visual markers into the
transgenic plants to aid in notification.'54 Both results benefit the
individual farmer. First, if the patent holder chooses to stem the tide of
pollen drift, the farmer will not be subject to contamination from the
pollen and will not suffer liability for innocent infringement. Second, if
the patent holder incorporates visual markers, the farmer will be able to
easily identify the alien crops and can request removal or sue for
common-law property torts or, if desired, license the improved seed.
2.
The Rights of the Patent Holder
Patent holders rights are also protected by this doctrine. Application
of this requirement allows patent holders to prosecute those who infringe
on their patents. In the Schmeiser context, the patent holder would be
able to utilize this doctrine to prosecute infringers who espouse their
innocence while they knowingly benefit from use of the patented
product.
By showing that Schmeiser selected for the patented crop, Monsanto
would be able to show that in combination with their notice to cease
infringement of the Roundup Ready corn, Schmeiser was able to comply
with its requests. Moreover, while this doctrine withholds damages, it
does not withhold the patent holder's ability to seek an injunction against
infringing farmers.'55 Of the proposed doctrines in this area such as first
sale, implied license/waiver, misuse, intent-to-acquire, and the stray
animal doctrine, this solution provides the patent holder with the
strongest rights.

154. Bratspies, supra note 17, at 399-401. Professor Bratspies suggests several possibilities for

containment. One promising approach in this context is by "[tiransforming chloroplast DNA rather
than nuclear DNA." The chloroplast is maternally inherited and, as such, there is usually very little
chloroplast DNA in pollen. Bratspies also recommends visual markers to identify transgenic crops.
Noting that more than iO years ago the technology existed to combine firefly DNA with tobacco to
make it luminescent, Bratspies suggests it would not be that difficult to create these markers.
Aoki, supra note i8, at 252-57. Professor Aoki suggests that seed manufacturers can utilize the
"Terminator" technology which is inserted into a plant cell and restricts seeds to one generation,
rendering second-generation seeds sterile. Id. at 255. This technology, developed by the U.S.D.A. and
Delta and Pine Land Company, is now owned by Monsanto. Id. at 256.
155. In seeking an injunction, the problem may still exist as to whether it would be possible for an
infringing farmer to comply if they were unable to identify which crops were infringing and which were
not.
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3. The Purpose of the PatentAct and Notice Requirement
The purpose of the Patent Act has constitutional pedigree. Congress
was expressly directed to create a patent system to "promote the
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries.' ' 1 6 As mentioned above, the purpose of the notice
requirement is to "prevent patent owners from deceiving the public by
distributing unmarked (and hence apparently copyable) articles which
are in fact covered by a patent."'57 The proposed rule promotes the
progress of science by requiring patent holders to identify their patent
and thus provide a clear means by which they may enforce their
monopoly against infringers. Without identification, it is difficult to
identify in the first place who is infringing on the patent. Moreover, the
proposed rule also prevents innocent farmers from unknowingly
infringing on the patent.
The proposed rule does not vitiate the notice requirement but rather
bolsters it. Loose application of the notice requirement will undermine
the purpose of preventing innocent infringement and reads the rule out
of existence. Furthermore, interpreting the rule in this fashion will not
eliminate protections for transgenic plant patent holders. It is limited to
situations involving unidentifiable, self-replicating products which spread
outside the control of those who possess it. As mentioned above, the
patent holder has several options for controlling his loss of protections in
this regard.
Finally, this rule is applicable to all patents generally, not just
transgenic crops. It would equally apply to the oil-eating bacterium
invented by Chakrabarty and the Harvard Oncomouse. It could also
apply to patented computer programs distributed through a selfreplicating method. It is not limited to the aforementioned factual
predicates.
4. The ProposedRule is Economically Efficient
As the doctrine stands today, the patent holder may enforce his
patent against an innocent farmer. Absent an intent requirement, the
farmer has an implied duty to police his crops lest he finds himself liable
for infringement. This places an economic burden on farmers while
providing economic benefit of the monopoly to the patent holder. Due to
the problems identified with asserting common-law property claims, the
farmer does not have an equal position here. As a result, this rule will not
provide an economically efficient result.
The proposed rule, however, does provide an optimal balance. The

156. U.S. Const. Art. z, § 8, cl. 8.
157. 7-20 CHISUM,supra note 102, § 20.03 [7][c].
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patent holder has the ability to control the spread and identification of
the patent. Imposition of this rule, gives the patent holder the choice of
controlling the spread of the item or developing a way to identify the
product sufficiently. The burden is thus placed on the party who is best
suited to control the item. Furthermore, the rule will produce a clear line
which will discourage litigation in this developing controversy. With a
more specific rule, patent holders, investors, and those seeking patents
are in the position to integrate those costs into the development of the
product.
C.

THE PROPOSED RULE iS APPLICABLE TO BROADER PATENT TYPES AND
Is LIKELY TO BE SUPPORTED BY THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

Outside the agricultural context, the proposed notice rule applies in
other contexts. For example, this rule would have proven helpful in
addressing the problem facing the district court and the Federal Circuit
when dealing with the issues presented in SmithKline Beecham Corp. v.
Apotex Corp. s8 The facts, while mired in the complexity of
pharmaceutical jargon, are very similar to the corn hypotheticals above.
Instead of genetically modified corn, the litigation concerned the patent
for Paxil, a popular antidepressant drug.
In 1977, Ferrosan, a British research company, first obtained a
patent for a new antidepressant drug called paroxetine.'5 9 Pharmaceutical
manufacturer, SmithKline ("SKB")'6 licensed paroxetine from Ferrosan
and began the long process of Federal Drug Administration ("FDA")
approval.' 6' In March 1985, a chemist at SKB discovered a new form of
paroxetine. 62 In contrast to the older "anhydrous" form, the new formhemihydrate- was a significant discovery for SKB because
it is more
6
stable and easier to control in the manufacturing process. 1
The question, one may ask, is what anhydrous and hemihydrous
versions of pharmaceuticals have to do with corn. The answer is the
theory of "seeding" which produces results analogous to crosspollination. A simple explanation of "seeding" is that when hemihydrate
crystals of paroxetine come into contact with anhydrous crystals, the
older anhydrous version will tend to convert spontaneously into the
newer more stable hemihydrate form.' 64 The concept of "seeding," was
i58. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp. (SKBi), 247 F. Supp. 2d ioii (N.D. In. 2003);
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp. (SKB2), 365 F.3d 13o6 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
159. SKBi, 247 F. Supp. 2d at o15.
i6o. The patent was acquired by SmithKline prior to their merger with Beecham. For the purpose
of this note, however, the company is referred to consistently as SKB.
16i. Id. at ioI6.
162. For a detailed scientific explanation of the anhydrate and hemihydrate forms and their
interaction see SKBi, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 1015-23.
163. Id. at I7.
164. Id. at 1019-20. This is, of course, an oversimplification of the scientific theory of "seeding."
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central in the decisions of SKBi and SKB2.
SKB applied for and was granted a patent for hemihydrous
paroxetine

in

I988. 65

Several

years

later,

when

generic

drug

manufacturer Apotex began making versions of the older anhydrous
paroxetine, they were faced with a huge problem. As a result of seeding,
they were unable to make the older anhydrous form without also
unintentionally producing some amounts of the newer, more stable,
hemihydrate paroxetine. As a result, SKB filed a patent infringement suit
against Apotex.
The two parties presented their cases at a bench trial in front of
Circuit Court Judge Richard A. Posner.' 66 In a detailed decision, Posner
answered the question of infringement in six alternative responses. Three
of these responses are applicable here. First, Posner reasoned that in
order to infringe, Apotex must be producing hemihydrate in
"commercially significant amounts." '67 Second, even if the commercially
significant theory is not adopted, Apotex can claim, as a complete
defense, that SKB contributed to the infringement.' 68 And third, even if
Apotex does not have any defense to infringement, it6 9would "be contrary
to the principles of equity" to grant injunctive relief.'
The first theory arose in the claim construction context. In
interpreting the hemihydrate claim, Posner determined that in order to
have the properties valued by the new form, the drug needed to have a
certain percentage of hemihydrate crystals. Reading the claim as
"crystalline paroxetine hydrochloride hemihydrate in any quantity
sufficient to have any commercial significance" he declared that "it is
clear that there is no infringement and the case is over.' 7 Posner
rejected SKB's theory, dubbed the "single-crystal theory," that even
producing a single crystal of hemihyrdate should be considered
infringement.
Posner provided another theory in the event that the Federal Circuit
should determine the single-crystal theory applicable. He reasoned that
"[a]lthough [he could not] find any statutory language or case law that
bears on the question, [he] believe[d] that as a matter of fundamental
principle it must be a defense to a charge of patent infringement that the
patentee caused the infringement."' '7 I He determined that the seed
crystals either "wafted [to Apotex] from SmithKline" or was produced
For a more detailed discussion see Posner's discussion in SKBi. Id.
165. Id. at 1017.
166. Judge Posner was sitting by designation in this district court case.
167. SKBi, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 1052.

168. Id.
i69. Id.
170. Id. at 1031 (emphasis added).
17. Id. at 1043.
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when Apotex legally manufactured the drug in the pre-generic testing
phase.'72 In Posner's opinion, under either theory, SKB was responsible
for the seeding.'73
Finally, Posner offered a third theory which would protect Apotex's
innocent infringement against SKB's request for injunctive relief.
Because the grant of injunctive relief is equitable, he reasoned that the
broader principles of equity govern. Evoking the principles of the
doctrines of unclean hands and patent misuse, Posner held that granting
injunctive relief against Apotex "would be contrary to the principles of
equity. ' Posner clearly identified the problem facing Apotex, and
similarly the problem facing farmers who innocently acquire transgenic
crops:
Unlike copyright law, moreover, patent law does not recognize a
defense of independent creation. The fact that if Apotex does create
hemihydrate as a byproduct of its attempt to manufacture publicdomain anhydrate it will not be deliberately "copying" SmithKline is
irrelevant.
For remember that inadvertency is not a defense to infringement; there
is no defense of independent creation. "The primary purpose of this
requirement of definiteness in claims is to provide clear warning to
others as to what constitutes infringement of the patent," 3 Donald S.
Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 8.03, p. 8-18 (2002), because "a zone of
uncertainty which enterprise and experimentation may enter only at
the risk of infringement claims would discourage invention only a little
less than unequivocal foreclosure of the field."7 United Carbon Co. v.
Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942).1
While the Federal Circuit concurred in the result-finding SKB's
patent invalid-it criticized Posner's reasoning as "policy driven."' 76 The
court upheld SKB's single-crystal theory of infringement and found that
Apotex was in fact infringing7 7 Despite this determination, the court
ultimately invalidated the SKB2 patent. Because SKB's clinical trials of
the hemihydrate paroxetine were considered public use of the product,
172. Id. Apotex was authorized to begin generic production of the hemihydrate paroxetine in
anticipation of the expiration of SKB's patent. Id.
173. Posner also offered evidence which suggested that Apotex considered the hemihydrate
crystals "impurities" and made efforts to reduce the hemihydrate amounts in order to protect
themselves from patent infringement claims. Additionally, he was convinced that there seemed to be

no effective method to prevent "seeding." See, e.g., id. at io2o-2I (describing an Antarctic
manufacturing plant analogy).
174. Id. at 1052.
175. Id. at 1028.

176. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp. (SKB2), 365 F.3 d 13o6, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
("Claim construction, however, is not a policy-driven inquiry."); id. at 1316 ("While these concerns are
certainly legitimate, claim construction, as noted before, proceeds independent of its policy
implications.").
177. Id. at 1321.
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the patent was therefore in use more than a year prior to the patent
application.""
While it is unclear whether the result of the majority in SKB2 is
based on a sympathetic view of Apotex's situation, the concurrence by
Judge Gajarsa, echoes Posner's frustration with Apotex's plight:
Paroxetine hemihydrate is presumably a synthetic compound, created
by humans in a laboratory, never before existing in nature, that is
nevertheless capable of "reproducing" itself through a natural process.
This crystalline compound raises a question similar to one that might
arise when considering the invention of a fertile plant or a genetically
engineered organism, capable of reproduction, released into the wild.
Consider, for example, what might happen if the wind blew fertile,
genetically modified blue corn protected by a patent, from the field of
a single farmer into neighboring cornfields. The harvest from those
fields would soon contain at least some patented blue corn mixed in
with the traditional public domain yellow corn-thereby infringing the
patent. The wind would continue to blow, and the patented crops
would spread throughout the continent, thereby turning most (if not
all) North American corn farmers into unintentional, yet inevitable,
infringers. The implication-that the patent owner would be entitled to
collect royalties from every farmer whose cornfields contained even a
few patented blue stalks-cannot possibly be correct. The underlying
question that engaged the district court, and that led it to develop
numerous alternative holdings, is why this implication is incorrect.'79
Although Judge Gajarsa recognizes that there is a problem with
public notice in this case, he bases his conclusion on the subject matter of
the patent.' 80 His reasoning is based on the premise that "products
capable of being 'reproduced by nature unaided by man' are not
patentable subject matter under [Patent Act] Section ioi."8'
Consequently, when Apotex manufactured anhydrous paroxetine, any
hemihydrate crystals were produced through the "natural" process of
"seeding" and are therefore outside the scope of SKB's patent."'
Accordingly, he would find SKB's patent invalid on this ground.

178. The court reasoned that while this was a different form of paroxetine, its efficacy was not at
issue and therefore clinical trials did not fall under the experimental use exception.
179. SKB2, 365 F.3d at 1330-31 (Gajarsa, J., concurring) (citation and footnotes omitted).
18o. See id. at 1328 (Gajarsa, J., concurring).
concurring) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 313
r81. Id. at 1332 (Gajarsa, J.,
(198o)).
182. Id. (Gajarsa, J., concurring). It is unclear whether Judge Gajarsa would have felt similarly had
the "seeding" resulted in loo% pure hemihydrate. It is also of interest that Judge Gajarsa's holding is
potentially at odds with the Federal Circuit's holding in Monsanto v. McFarling, which was decided
just two weeks prior to SKB2. However, the two cases can be distinguished first on the grounds that
Monsanto and McFarling entered into a licensing agreement while Apotex did not license either the
anhydrous paroxetine or the paroxetine hemihydrate. Second, McFarling could have ceased
infringement by purchasing unpatented soybeans. Ultimately, however, in both McFarling and SKB2,
the patented material was being "produced by nature" with the same effort and knowledge by the
alleged infringers.
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Unfortunately, the majority's holding in SKB2 does not create any
rule which can be applied broadly to address the concerns of Posner,
Judge Gajarsa, or the author of this Note. In short, the court left the
decision open for another day. If the courts were to reconsider this case
again in light of the proposed rule in this Note, they would find a solution
that is more equitable than either Posner's or Judge Gajarsa's.
Posner's proposed solutions, while somewhat equitable, are
admittedly not based on statutory language. For that reason, the rules
can be manipulated to produce varied and inconsistent results. This is
likely why the Federal Circuit criticized Posner's decision as policy
driven and why it is not likely to be broadly adopted. Additionally, in the
context of transgenic cross-pollination, Posner's equitable defense theory
could destroy patent rights for transgenic seed producers. Because the
manufacturers are the source of the transgenic pollen, Posner would
to patent
likely hold that neighboring farmers have an equitable defense
83
infringement and could legally produce the patented product.'
Judge Gajarsa's solution, while based on established precedent, is
likely to lead to inequitable results. As he would not extend patent
protection to matter produced through a "natural" process, plants
resulting from transgenic cross-pollination would not be infringing.' 4
Accordingly, neighboring farmers who had innocently acquired the
patented plants could infringe with impunity using "natural pollination"
as a shield.
Applying the proposed interpretation of the Notice Requirement to
the paroxetine context would achieve an equitable balance of rights.
Here, Apotex was legally manufacturing a drug whose patent had
expired. SKB had two notice options. First, it could affix the patent
number to the product itself. However, while it was possible to affix the
patent number to the drug packaging, the seeding occurred through
microscopic crystals which wafted into the anhydrous production
process. Therefore, this first notice requirement could not have been met
and SKB must rely on the second form of notice.
The second method must provide enough information in the notice
to allow the alleged infringer to cease infringing. The result is that
Apotex could continue manufacturing anhydrous paroxetine even
though it inevitably and unintentionally produced amounts of paroxetine
hemihydrate.
This outcome is distinguishable, however, from the SKB decisions
discussed above because the patent remains valid. If Apotex decided, for
example, to produce and sell paroxetine hemihydrate during SKB's
183. As noted above, these manufacturers only license transgenic seeds to farmers but retain the
rights to the transgenic pollen and future generations of the patented plants.
184. See also explanation supra note 182.
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patent term, it would be violating SKB's patent. Additionally, if Apotex
intentionally "seeded" the anhydrous production process to create its
own hemihydrate pills, SKB could show that Apotex had proper notice.
By intentionally seeding the environment, Apotex would know it was
producing a patented product and would also have the ability to cease its
intentional conduct. Accordingly, it would be in violation of SKB's
patent, and liable to SKB for damages.
This rule therefore recognizes and protects SKB's contribution and
investment. In addition, this rule does not require any policy-driven
balancing of equity but instead focuses on whether the alleged infringer
has the capability of avoiding infringement. Futhermore, as discussed
above, this rule is optimally balanced to achieve an economically
efficient and equitable result.
CONCLUSION

85
The spread of transgenic pollen is not just inevitable, it is a reality.'
As genetic expertise increases, the value of the crops also increases. It
will be essential for patent holders to protect this investment by strictly
enforcing intellectual property rights. Farmers who innocently acquire
transgenic crops through cross-pollination are likely to become the
targets of the resulting litigation. Through a strong adherence to the
language and purpose of section 287(a) of the Patent Act, the identity of
patented, self-replicating organisms can be brought into the open. This
will enable innocent farmers to utilize the protections of common-law
property protections while concurrently respecting the monopoly rights
of patent holders to enforce their patents.

185. See MELLON & RISSLER supra, note 75 (reporting on the widespread presence of transgenic
pollen in the traditional seed supply).
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